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not allow agency questions to inhibit their determination of whether
election results reflect true voter sentiment.
The concept of agency is a factor in a proper review of election
conditions. The principal-agent relationship, however, should not be
conclusive. The Fourth Circuit in Georgetown Dress relied upon the
committee's status as the union's agent in finding that a fair election
had not occurred. That approach emphasized too greatly the agency
factor. Rather, where improper conduct during the campaign had the
probable effect of influencing votes, the validity of the election should
not depend upon whether agency principles can join the offending
party and either the union or employer. The destruction of the requi-
site laboratory conditions is no less real and voter preference no less
biased in the event such a link cannot be established.
BRUCE A. KAYUHA
IX. MILITARY ENLISTMENT CONTRACTS
The discontinuance of the draft' and the advent of an all-
volunteer army have caused military enlistment contracts to acquire
an increasing significance.' Concerned about maintaining adequate
Sonoco of Puerto Rico, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 493, 86 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1974) (election set
aside on basis of threats not attributable to union or company) with Hyster Co. v.
NLRB, 480 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1973) (employer not chargeable with acts of town
council chairman) and Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 208 N.L.R.B. 167, 85 L.R.R.M. 1285
(1974) (no interference by union, and election not set aside if threats not attributable
to union).
I General induction authority expired on July 1, 1973. 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c)
(Supp. IV, 1974), amending 50 U.S.C. § 467(c) (1970).
2 Dilloff, A Contractual Analysis of the Military Enlistment, 8 U. RICH. L. REv.
121 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dilloff]. The major challenge facing the Department
of Defense in effectively instituting the all-volunteer army was to attract enough enlis-
tees of quality to meet national security needs. The Department has been successful
in this effort, and it is expected to be able to maintain a full peacetime force on a
volunteer basis. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 11500 Before the House
Committee on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. In the first six months of fiscal year 1976, the Armed Forces recruited
215,400 members, or 100.3% of their objective. Id. Although there are differences
among the enlistment contracts of the various armed services, generally there are four
basic components: a) the enlistment document; b) a verbal or written oath of allegi-
ence; c) the statement of understanding; d) any federal statutes or regulations which
may affect the enlistee under the contract. Dilloff, supra at 123. Pfile v. Corcoran, 287
F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968), is an example of a court's recognition of the enlistment
contract. The court in Pfile held that the statement of understanding was the most
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numbers in the military, Congress has provided inducements to at-
tract qualified people to enlist in the armed forces.3 Paramount
among these inducements are bonuses, which are often awarded when
members of the military reenlist.' Enforcement of promises for bo-
nuses made by the military frequently has been sought in the federal
courts on the basis of contract principles.5 The Fourth Circuit re-
cently considered the issue of the enforceability of a bonus promise
in a military reenlistment contract in Carini v. United States.6
In Carini, the appellees brought an action to recover a Variable
Reenlistment Bonus(VRB)' promised to them as consideration for
extending their original term of enlistment. In 1974, while the appel-
lees were still serving their initial tour of enlistment, but after their
contract for VRBs had been executed, Congress changed the law
concerning VRBs and provided for Selective Reenlistment Bonuses
(SRB), while abolishing the VRB.8 The appellees were unable to
important part of the contract since it contained the duties and obligations of the
parties involved. Id. at 557. While the other components of the contract are important,
they are not absolutely necessary because they function more as a formality. Id.;
Dilloff, supra at 126.
3 Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. granted,
45 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976)(No. 76-413). Inducements such as bonuses are
based upon the fact that a party in a free bargaining position, such as the government,
can protect its self-interest. Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduc-
tion to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1969). The Department of Defense's success
in meeting recruitment goals is, to a large degree, the result of a vigorous recruiting
and advertising campaign. One widely used recuiting incentive is the enlistment and
reenlistment bonus. Hearings, supra note 2, at 35.
533 F.2d at 1169. As long ago as 1795 statutes were enacted to provide monetary
bonuses for reenlistment. Act of January 2, 1795, ch. 9 § 5, 1 Stat. 408 (1795).
5 Courts have traditionally regarded military enlistment contracts as contracts
that change the status of the person enlisting. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 157 (1890).
When there is a change of status, "no breach of the contract destroys the new status
or relieves [the enlistee] from the obligations which its existence imposes." Id. at 151.
Recently, however, courts have tended to construe military contracts strictly in accord-
ance with contract law. E.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Dec 7, 1976)(No. 76-413); Gausmann v. Laird,
422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969).
1 528 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975).
7 Variable Reenlistment Bonuses were authorized by Congress for persons having
specialized military skills that were in short supply. 37 U.S.C. § 308(g) (1970). This
purpose was reflected in the House Reports which stated, "The most attractive way
to provide a strong reenlistment incentive to first termers in a small part of the force
is through a variable reenlistment bonus. A reenlistment bonus concentrates retention
money at the reenlistment decision point, thereby getting the most drawing power per
retention dollar." H.R. REP. No. 549, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 (1965).
The 1974 revision limited eligibility for the reenlistment bonus to those service-
men who possessed designated skills and who agreed to reenlist for a period of at least
1977]
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qualify for the SRB because they failed to cancel their VRB agree-
ments and sign new contracts providing for a longer period of service.?
While the district court held that the 1965 statute providing for VRBs
became a part of the reenlistment agreement, the Fourth Circuit held
that it did not."0 In reversing the district court, the court of appeals
perceived reenlistment bonuses not as part of an enforceable con-
tract, but a form of pay subject to complete congressional control."
Since military pay is not fixed at the time of the signing of the
enlistment or reenlistment contract, 2 the court reasoned that con-
tract consideration clauses are entered into with the knowledge of
possible statutory alterations. 3 Congress' deliberate changing of the
qualifications for reenlistment bonuses thus resulted in an unenforce-
able contract right for the payment of VRBs.'4
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Carini, however, is in direct con-
flict with the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in Larionoff v.
three years rather than the two years called for underVRB provisions. Armed Forces
Enlisted Person Bonus Revision Act of 1974, § 2 (1), 37 U.S.C. § 308 (Supp. IV. 1974).
The new statute also contains a "grandfather clause" which grants options to those
people eligible for a reenlistment extension agreement who sign a new extention
agreement requiring a period of extended service of at least two years greater than
called for in the original extension agreement. Id.
' The 1974 amendments preserved an enlistee's right to receive regular reenlist-
ment bonuses, but there was no provision for the preservation of the VRB, which was
considered a special bonus. 528 F.2d at 740.
Id. at 741.
" Id. The Fourth Circuit rested its finding on the Supreme Court's determination
in Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 401 (1961), that "a soldier's entitlement to pay
is dependent upon statutory right." That a soldier's entitlement to pay depends upon
statutory right and not upon common law rules such a quantum meruit finds support
in Abbott v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 384, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973).
2 The Fourth Circuit determined that military pay is not fixed at the time of the
signing of the contract because it is subject "to the unfettered control of the Congress,"
528 F.2d at 741, which has paramount power regarding the support and control of the
armed forces. See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11 528 F.2d at 741. The court's discussion of contract consideration clauses is
strictly dicta since it previously determined that reenlistment bonuses are not an
enforceable part of the contract. Id.
1 Id. Although the Fourth Circuit denied the appellees the relief they sought, the
court did sympathize with their situation:
While in a legal sense they must be held to an awareness that Congress
might change the statutes, they could not be charged with anticipa-
tion that the Congress would so change the statute as to make them
unqualified for any special bonus .... Under the circumstances the
Cbngress may wish to reconsider their situation and the moral claims
they have against the United States.
Id. at 741-42.
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United States." As in Carini, the plaintiffs in Larionoff brought ac-
tion to recover promised VRB awards. 6 The D.C. Circuit examined
the legislative history of VRBs to ascertain their purpose and intent,"
and found that Congress viewed VRBs as providing a useful incentive
toward a career in the military at a time when a person is deciding
whether to reenlist.' s
The D.C. Circuit examined the military regulations concerning
the granting of VRBs to determine at what time eligibility for the
bonus began." Despite the government's argument that the right to
VRBs attached only when an extension or reenlistment period ac-
tually began,2 the court in Larinoff concluded that the appellants
were entitled to the VRBs in effect at the time they signed their
reenlistment agreements." In determining the effect of the 1974 re-
peal of the VRB statute and the subsequent enactment of the SRB
statute, the D.C. Circuit effectively stated that reenlistment bonuses
are contractual agreements enforceable against the government as
property interests protected by the fifth amendment." Because of the
is 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Dec. 7,
1976)(No. 76-413).
11 Id. at 1172. In the alternative, the plaintiffs in Larionoff requested the rescission
of their extension agreements accompanied with an order granting Honorable Dis-
charges pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 6291 (1970). 533 F.2d at 1172 n.14.
11 Among the sources used by the D.C. Circuit in ascertaining legislative intent
were Hearings on H.R. 5724 and H.R. 8714 Before the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., ser.13, at 2545 (1965). During floor debate over the
Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1965, Representative Morton stated, "the career moti-
vation that will be generated among the hard core elements, specifically the highly
trained technical people throughout the services, will more than make up in actual
dollars saved for the cost of the legislation [concerning VRBs]." 111 CONG. Rc. 17206
(1965).
11 533 F.2d at 1175. During the floor debate concerning the implementation of the
Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1965, Congress was persuaded that the Defense De-
partment's belief in the VRB provisions was justified, since they would defer the cost
of training a replacement whenever a first term enlistee chose to reenlist. 111 CONG.
Rac. 17206 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Morton).
"1 533 F.2d at 1175-76. The'D.C. Circuit specifically referred to Department of
Defense Instruction 1304, 15, VI. A. (Sept. 3, 1970), in determining that eligibility
for the VRBs accrued from the date the extension agreements were signed. Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1175.
21 See note 19 supra. The court supported its holding by stating that military
obligations "obviously contemplate a situation in which enlisted personnel attain
eligibility prior to the point at which they enter into periods of extended service." 533
F.2d at 1177.
= Id. at 1179. the Fourth Circuit in Carini failed to address this point because it
concluded that reenlistment bonuses were not an enforceable contract right, therefore
no issue concerning property interests protected by the fifth amendmentwould arise.
See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
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inherent property interests involved,2 the Larionoff court held that
congressional authority to abrogate government contracts was lim-
ited.2 The court's review of the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ment led to the conclusion that the basic purpose of the legislation
was to reduce government spending.2 This objective, the Larionoff
court concluded, did not give Congress the power to alter the con-
tracts between the plaintiff and the Navy."
The major discrepancy between the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Carini and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Larionoff is the interpreta-
tion of the contracts involving reenlistment bonuses. The court in
Carini determined that VRBs were not included in the reenlistment
agreement, and that the contract itself anticipated the possibility of
changes.Y This finding has some legitimacy because of the congres-
sional intent reflected in reports accompanying the institution of
SRBs.2 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit failed to analyze or cite any
3 Contractual rights are property interests protected by the fifth amendment. 533
F.2d at 1179. See e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 337 (1935); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). Although not concerned with military enlistment
contracts, Perry and Lynch both held that contract obligations by the government are
recognized as property rights and if the government makes unilateral abrogations, the
claimant has been deprived of his property without due process of law.
24 533 F.2d at 1179. This analysis is supported by Caola v. United States, 404 F.
Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1975). In Caola, the plaintiffs sought habeas corpus relief or
monetary damages for breach of a promise to pay VRBs. The government argued that
even if the Navy were contractually obligated to pay the VRBs, the obligation was
unenforceable because of Congress' plenary power to establish and alter military pay.
404 F. Supp. at 1106. The court refuted this argument by holding that the government
can only unilaterally change contracts for the purpose of protecting the welfare of its
citizens. Id. at 1107. This holding was based upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), which stated that limita-
tions upon the government's impairment of contractual obligations are included within
the fifth amendment's prohibition of a taking without just compensation. Id. at 438.
2 533 F.2d at 1180. In its consideration of legislative history, the D.C. Circuit
stated, "[o]ur review of the legislative history leads us to conclude that the Congress
was primarily concerned with reducing government expenditures by more narrowly
tailoring the reenlistment bonus scheme to actual military requirements." Id. See H.R.
REP. No. 93-857, 93d Cong., 2dSess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2984-85.
21 533 F.2d at 1180.
2 528 F.2d at 741. The court based its determination on the belief that VRBs were
granted in consideration of the "pay, benefits and allowances which will accure" from
the time an individual performs his services. Id.
21 The major report supporting the Carini court's findings was entitled
"Clarification of Interpretation of Bill Language." H.R. CON. REP. No. 93-985, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2998, 3000.
Congress indicated that it would allow those eligible for VRBs to cancel their old
extension agreements and sign new ones calling for a longer period of extended service.
Id. at 3000. See note 9 supra.
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legislative history to support its holding." In contrast, the court in
Larionoff extensively considered legislative history in determining
that the plaintiff had an enforceable contract right to the VRBs.'
The status of VRBs and enlistment contracts has been litigated
in several district courts,3' and the decisions all presaged the holding
in Larionoff. The Fourth Circuit itself expressed some reluctance
concerning its decision in Carini, finding the plaintiff's situation very
appealing and calling upon Congress to enact provisions for granting
the promised bonuses. 2 The Fourth Circuit's support of the unilateral
modification of enlistment contracts by congressional assertion of
supervening public policy" has hindered the evolution of enlistment
agreements toward the status of true contracts. 4
The Fourth Circuit's restrictive approach toward granting relief to
" The Fourth Circuit was criticized by the D.C. Circuit for its inadequate analysis
of the issues in Carini. 533 F.2d at 1191.
'The most important aspect of the Larionofi court's interpretation of the legisla-
tive history of VRBs and SRBs was its conclusion that the reason for abolishing VRBs
was financial only and did not arise from "the exercise of a paramount governmental
power. . . ." 533 F.2d at 1179. See notes 23-25 supra.
1, 533 F.2d at 1180 n.35. Aiken v. United States, Civ. No. 75-0062-N (S.D. Cal.
August 26, 1975); Collins v. Schlesinger, Civ. No. 75-0053 (D. Hawaii May 20, 1975);
Caola v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1975). The issues before these
courts were indentical to those before the Carini and Larionoff courts of appeals. Using
basically the same analysis as Larionoff, the courts found the existence of an enforcea-
ble contract right. For a discussion of Caola, see note 24 supra.
2 See note 14 supra. Congress anticipated the problem noting that:
In cases where commitment [a binding contract] has been made to
a man with a four-year enlistment and a two-year extension that he
can cancel the two-year extension and reenlist for four years and re-
ceive a reenlistment bonus for the four-year enlistment. The Navy
expressed great concern that the language of the bill might be inter-
preted to require it to abrogate an understanding it had with enlistees
and would operate in such a way as to cause serious retention prob-
lems in its most critical career field.
H.R. CoN. REP. No. 985, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2998, 3000. The Fourth Circuit seemed to imply that it was Congress'
responsibility to make provisions for those affected by statutory changes, and that the
courts should not interfere.
Congressional assertion of supervening policy in the area of military enlistment
contracts has found support in many cases. See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147
(1890); Antonuk v. United States, 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971).
3 Courts have taken an increasing interest in interpreting enlistment contracts as
true contracts. Dilloff, supra note 2, at 148. When these agreements are considered as
contracts they are governed by the law of contracts. Larionoff is an example of a case
in which the court used contract law to determine not only the type of agreement
between the parties, but the allowable damages when there was a breach of that
agreement. 533 F.2d at 1180.
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individuals alleging breaches of their enlistment contracts was also
illustrated in Reamer v. United States." In Reamer, the appellant
brought suit to recover expenses for an unfinished semester of school.
The appellant contended that the military had failed to honor its
agreement to delay his start of active duty until after he had finished
a semester of law school. At issue was whether a typed statement
deferring the appellant's entry into active duty was effective against
the Army.38 Evidence regarding the meaning of the statement dif-
fered. The appellant testified that he believed the statement would
delay the start of his active duty; enlisting officers for the Army,
however, claimed that they had told the appellant the statement
concerning the delay was only a request and would not become valid
until approved by the Army.37 In denying the appellant relief, the
court viewed the questioned statement in terms of ordinary contract
law and found no error in the district court's admission of oral testi-
mony to resolve the ambiguity in the interpretation of the contract.3
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of enlistment contracts in Carini
and Reamer was not wholly consistent and the factual differences
between the cases seemingly do not justify the discrepancies. The
court in Carini did not allow the assertion of an action based upon
contract law because it refused to recognize the reenlistment bonus
as part of the contract.39 In Reamer, however, the Fourth Circuit held
that the questioned statement was included in the contract, and the
court specifically stated that the usual rules of contract law would be
applied to resolve the issue concerning the Army's promise." Al-
though Carini and Reamer possibly have reconcilable factual differ-
ences,41 they do illustrate how the Fourth Circuit has varied its inter-
- 532 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
u The 56th paragraph of the enlistment contract was entitled "Remarks" and
included the words, "Delayed from ... active duty until 1 Feb. '69." 532 F.2d at 350.
" Although the enlisting officers had limited authority to bind the army to enlist-
ment contracts, delays of more than 120 days were not a usual part of enlistment
contracts and required special permission from a higher autority. This authority was
presumed to come from within the Department of the Army. Id. at 351-52.
11 Id. at 352. C.f. Roman v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. N.Y. 1975). Roman
was a habeas corpus action by a Navy sonar technician seeking release from a two-
year enlistment extension agreement. The petitioner asserted that his reason for sign-
ing the extension was based upon the promise of an assignment to computer school.
The action failed because contrary testimony by the recruiter indicated that the peti-
tioner was never guaranteed any particular school. Further grounds for the dismissal
of the action were based upon the petitioner's inability to show that the schooling he
received had less value than the schooling he was allegedly promised.
" See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
0 532 F.2d at 351.
" The court in Carini held that legislation can alter an enlistment contract, 528
